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We compare the saving behavior of two cohorts: the Early Baby Boomers (EBB, age 51- 
56 in 2004) and the HRS cohort (age 51-56 in 1992). We find that EBB have 
accumulated more wealth than the previous cohort but they benefited from a large 
increase in house prices, which lifted the wealth of many home-owners. In fact, there are 
many families among EBB, particularly those headed by respondents with low education, 
low income, and minorities, which have less wealth than the previous cohort. Lack of 
wealth can be traced to lack of retirement planning. Notwithstanding the many initiatives 
aimed at fostering planning in the 1990s, a large portion of EBB still do not plan for 
retirement even though most respondents are close to it. The effect of planning is 
remarkably similar between the two cohorts; those who do not plan accumulate much 
lower amounts of wealth –from 20 to 45 percent depending on the location in the wealth 
distribution- than those who do plan. Thus, for both the EBB and the HRS cohort, lack of 
planning is tantamount to lack of saving irrespective of the many changes in the economy 
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Throughout the 1990s, employers have increasingly shifted from Defined Benefits (DB) 
to Defined Contributions (DC) pensions, where workers have to choose the amount of 
contributions and the allocation of retirement wealth. To facilitate these decisions, both 
employers and the government have taken initiatives to foster retirement savings and 
improve financial literacy via, for example, retirement seminars. At the same time, there 
has been an explosion in the financial industry of products and tools aimed at improving 
retirement planning. Have these changes had any impact on savings? We examine this 
question by comparing the saving behavior of two generations: the Early Baby Boomers 
(EBB), which are born between 1948 and 1953 and are therefore 51 to 56 years old in 
2004 and an earlier cohort (HRS cohort hereafter), which was born between 1936 and 
1941 and whose members are 51 to 56 years old in 1992. By examining individuals of the 
same age but at different points in time, we can assess how being born in different times 
and being exposed to different economic circumstances affects saving patterns.2 
 We find that most EBB accumulated more wealth than the previous generation.  
However, this derives mostly by the appreciation in housing equity; measures of non-
housing wealth show little or no changes between cohorts. There is also a sizeable group 
of EBB who display less rather than more wealth than the HRS cohort. These families are 
disproportionately those with low educational attainment or minorities, such as Blacks. 
The low-often minuscule- amounts of wealth held by many families, not only among the 
HRS cohort but increasingly so in the EBB cohort, is worrisome as these households are 
only 10 to 15 years away from retirement. We find that, for both cohorts, lack of wealth 
can be traced to lack of retirement planning.  Notwithstanding the many initiatives aimed 
                                                 
2 By comparing two generations at different points in time, we cannot distinguish between “time” 
and “cohort” effect. We will use the term cohort/time interchangeably. For a detailed discussion 
of this topic, see Kapteyn, Alessie and Lusardi (2005). 
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at fostering planning in the 1990s, a large portion of EBB still do not plan for retirement 
even though most respondents are close to it. Irrespective of the changes in the housing 
and stock market over time, the effect of planning is remarkably similar between cohorts; 
those who do not plan accumulate much lower amounts of wealth than those who do 
plan. At the median, non-planners hold 20 percent less wealth than planners, but figures 
are much higher (closer to 45 percent) for households at lower levels of the wealth 
distribution. Thus, both in 2004 and in 1992, lack of planning is tantamount to lack of 
savings. 
 The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the data and 
compare demographic characteristics and income between the two cohorts. We then 
examine levels and composition of household wealth. Further, we show that many EBB 
do not plan for retirement and that wealth varies substantially across degrees of planning. 
Finally, we assess the effects of planning on wealth using both quantile and Instrumental 
Variables (IV) estimation. 
 
Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
In our work, we use data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a 
nationally representative survey of older Americans over the age of 50 (and their spouses 
of any age). Specifically, we examine the “Early Boomer” cohort where at least one 
household member was born between 1948 and 1953 (age 51-56 in 2004). This group 
was first surveyed in 2004. We also examine the “HRS cohort” where at least one 
household member was born between 1936 and 1941 (age 51-56 in 1992). This group 
was interviewed in the first wave of the HRS in 1992. By comparing cohorts of the same 
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age (51-56) but in different time periods (2004 versus 1992), we can assess how being 
born in a different time and having lived in different economic conditions affects 
financial behavior.  
The EEB are particularly important to study; they are a large generation on the 
brink of retirement. Earlier studies about the saving behavior of the Baby Boomers have 
shown mixed results (compare, for example the findings of Bernheim (1993) with the 
Congressional Budget Office study (1993)). Similarly, studies which have examined the 
effects of retirement seminars during the 1990s have found contrasting estimates (for a 
review, see Lusardi (2004)). The advantage of our study with respect to previous work is 
that it utilizes a very rich and detailed source of data about savings and a host of 
demographic and economic characteristics that can affect wealth holdings. 
To carry out the comparison between these two cohorts, we construct 
demographic variables that are similar across years. In addition, we use the same 
definition of income and wealth. Specifically, our measure of total net worth includes 
checking and savings account balances, certificates of deposits and T-bills, bonds, stocks, 
IRAs and Keoghs, net housing equity, other real estate, net value of own businesses, cars 
and other vehicles minus debts. Total household income is the sum of labor and capital 
income, government transfer program income, and other income (gifts, lottery, etc.). All 
values are expressed in 2004 dollars and all statistics are weighted using the preliminary 
weights provided by the HRS for 2004 and the final weights for 1992.3  Questions about 
wealth in the HRS are asked to the most knowledgeable member in the household about 
financial matters- financial respondent hereafter. 
                                                 
3 In both 1992 and 2004, the HRS sample is not representative of the population in that age 
group. 
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To construct the final samples, we delete a handful of observations with missing 
information about demographic variables such as age, sex, marital status, number of 
children, and race and ethnicity. Moreover, we delete the observations with zero income 
as they are likely to be the result of measurement error. The final number of observations 
is 2,631 for the EBB and 4,577 for the HRS cohort. 
Table 1 illustrates several important changes in the demographic composition of 
the two cohorts. First, EBB display higher educational attainment than the HRS cohort.  
Not only are EBB more likely to have a college degree or more than college education 
but they are also less likely to be high-school drop-outs. Second, EBB are less likely to be 
married and more likely to have experienced a family break-up; the number of divorced 
increased from 14.8 percent in 1992 to 21.6 percent in 2004. Consequently, the number 
of families with children decreased over the time period. These changes were also noted 
in several other papers in this volume (Iams, Butrica and Smith; Manchester, Weaver, 
and Whitman; Wolfe, Haveman, Holden and Romanov). As expected, the proportion of 
Hispanic households increases from 1992 to 2004 (from 7.6 percent to 8.7 percent), while 
the proportion of Whites declined.4 Because wealth varies substantially across 
demographic groups and it is strongly affected by education, marital status, and race, it is 
important to keep these changes into account when examining household wealth 
holdings. 
Table 1 here 
Another important change over this period concerns the distribution of total 
household income between the EBB and the HRS cohort (Table 2). Both the mean and 
                                                 
4 Because race and ethnicity is not exclusive and Hispanics can also report being Whites, Blacks 
or Other Race in addition to being Hispanics, the percentages in Table 1 sum to more than 100. 
However, the same definition is used in both years. 
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median income among EBB was higher than the HRS cohort. If increases in household 
income are a proxy for increases in permanent income between the two cohorts, we 
expect wealth among EBB to have increased as a result of these changes in lifetime 
resources. Note, however, that EBB households below the median income report lower 
income than the households in the HRS cohort, perhaps as a result of the stagnation in 
wages for workers without a college degree during the 1990s (Autor, Katz, Kearney 
2006; Autor and Katz 1999). Since the households at the bottom of the income 
distribution are disproportionately those with low education, unmarried, and Blacks and 
Hispanics, we expect these groups to have more difficulties accumulating wealth in 2004 
than in 1992. 
Table 2 here 
The distribution of total net worth is displayed in Table 3A. When considering the 
mean and the third quartile, the EBB have accumulated more wealth than households in 
the HRS generation and differences are statistically significant between cohorts. 
However, consistent with the data on income discussed before, EBB in the lower quartile 
of the wealth distribution have accumulated lower amounts of wealth than the HRS 
cohort, although differences are not statistically significant (see also Table 4). These 
households are disproportionately those with low income and low education. Not only are 
these households more likely to display lower amount of wealth in 2004, but they are also 
more likely to be in debt. Note that, for both cohorts, the distribution of total net worth is 
very wide. Thus, there exist large differences in wealth even when looking at a narrow 
age group. 
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One major change the EBB experienced, particularly during 2002 and 2003, is a 
large increase in home prices. Thus, the increase in wealth among EBB may simply be 
the result of the appreciation in home equity. The distribution of total non-housing wealth 
in Table 3B shows that housing equity plays an important role in the level and 
composition of wealth of both generations. First, most households in both generations 
hold little beside housing wealth. Moreover, when we subtract housing equity, we find 
that, not only the households at the bottom of the wealth distribution, but even the median 
household in the EBB holds lower non-housing wealth than the previous generation. 
Thus, a large part of the increase in wealth between the two generations is in housing 
equity. This is also confirmed in our tests. When we compare mean wealth holdings 
between cohorts, we find a statistically higher total net worth in 2004 as compared to 
1992. However, the difference is simply driven by housing wealth; there are no 
statistically significant differences in mean non-housing wealth between cohorts. 
Tables 3A and 3B here 
The distribution of total net worth in the population hides some important 
differences across demographic groups. This is important to consider in view of the 
changes in demographic characteristics reported previously (Table 1). Table 4 shows that 
EBB with low educational attainment and minorities, such as Blacks, display lower 
amounts of wealth than the HRS cohort. Only EEB households with a college degree (or 
higher degrees) have higher wealth than HRS cohort with the same educational 
attainment. Note that, for EBB with less than a college degree, the amounts are lower 
throughout the wealth distribution. Moreover, a sizable proportion of the EBB with low 
education and Blacks and Hispanics arrive at retirement with minuscule amounts of 
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wealth, raising concerns about their future well-being into retirement. Finally, the 
distribution of wealth remains wide even within demographic groups in both years. Thus, 
there are many differences in the pattern of wealth even when we consider similar 
households in terms of both age and economic status. Other factors rather than age, 
income, and macro shocks influence wealth. Later, we show that lack of wealth both in 
the total sample and even after accounting for demographic characteristics can be traced 
to lack of retirement planning. 
We turn now to the composition of wealth between these two generations, which 
is illustrated in Table 5 and Figures 1A-1B. This is important in view of the large changes 
in both the stock and housing market during the 1990s, which could have influenced the 
wealth of EBB. Clearly one of the most important assets held by both generations is the 
home. Not only did home-ownership increase slightly between the two generations 
(differences are significant but only at the 10 percent level of significance), but home 
equity accounts for a third of total net worth among the EBB.  When we sum together 
home equity and other real estate – an asset prominent among wealthier households- the 
amount of wealth accounted for by total real estate is close to 50 percent for EBB, while 
it was 43.8 percent for the HRS cohort. Thus, exposure to the housing market has 
increased for the EBB compared to the HRS cohort. 
 Two other important assets in the portfolios of both EBB and the HRS cohort are 
stocks and IRAs or Keoghs. Again, ownership of these assets increases slightly between 
the two cohorts but differences are not statistically significant. Most households do not 
hold large amounts of wealth in stocks and IRAs; the share of wealth accounted for by 
stocks is 12.6 percent among EBB and 8.3 percent among the HRS cohort. The share of 
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IRAs or Keoghs is similar but slightly lower in both years. Assuming that all IRAs are 
invested in the stock market, more than 23 percent of EBB’s wealth is invested in the 
stock market, while a lower portion of the HRS cohort’s wealth, 15.8 percent, was 
invested in the stock market. Thus, in addition to the housing market, exposure to the 
stock market has also increased for EBB compared to the HRS cohort. 
Table 5 here 
Which households are affected by changes in the housing market and the stock 
market? Figures 1A and 1B show that the proportion of home-ownership, real estate, 
stock, and IRA ownership across the wealth distribution has not changed much across the 
two generations. Most importantly, while a large percentage of households in the lower 
deciles of the wealth distribution own a home, the percentage of stock-owners is high 
only at the top of the wealth distribution. Thus, while the vast majority of EBB and HRS 
households are exposed to the fluctuations in the housing market, a much smaller group 
of households is exposed to the fluctuations in the stock market. This finding is 
compounded by the fact that households in both cohorts hold large amounts of home 
equity, at least in relationship to their total wealth, while most households hold small 
amounts of stocks and IRAs. Lusardi and Mitchell (2006b) show that, if home prices by 
region in 2004 were to return to their levels of 2002-an average reduction of about 13 
percent- EBB would lose approximately 9 percent of total wealth. A reduction of similar 
magnitude in stock prices would reduce the wealth of EBB by only 2 percent (see also 
Gustman and Steinmeier 2002). This exercise is important because it shows that asset 
prices (mostly home prices) can play a major role in explaining changes in the 
distribution of wealth between generations. Most EBB have benefited from a remarkable 
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increase in home prices, which lifted their wealth with respect to the previous generation. 
However, it is not clear yet whether this change is long-lasting. 
Figures 1A and 1B here 
 Another asset that merits consideration is business equity. While business owners 
account for a small fraction of the population, they account for a sizable amount of total 
wealth (Gentry and Hubbard 2004; Hurst and Lusardi 2006). For example, while close to 
15 percent of EBB are business owners, the amount of wealth held in business equity 
among EBB is as large as the amount of wealth held in IRAs, even though 41.6 percent 
of EBB hold IRAs. Business owners are disproportionately located at the top of the 
wealth distribution. Using data from the HRS in 1992, Hurst and Lusardi (2006) show 
that as many of 82 percent of households in the top 3 percent of the wealth distribution 
are business owners. The percentage of business owners has decreased between cohorts 
and so is the share of total wealth invested in business equity. Since we rarely have all the 
relevant information to account for the differences between business owners and other 
households, in our empirical work, we exclude the business owners from our sample. 
 Before turning to an important determinant of total net worth in the next section, 
we need to mention that our analysis is limited to a narrow measure of wealth: total net 
worth, which includes IRAs and Keoghs but no other measures of pension and Social 
Security wealth. This is a limitation because, as Gustman and Steinmeier (1999) show, 
pension and Social Security wealth can account for as much as much half of total wealth. 
However, we do not have yet an accurate measure of these two components of total 
wealth for the EBB cohort. Moreover, as Cunningham, Engelhardt and Kumar in this 
volume show, current calculations of pension wealth may be affected by large errors. 
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Explaining Differences in Wealth Holdings: The Role of Planning 
 The previous analysis shows that the distribution of wealth among EBB and HRS 
is very wide. Differences in wealth in both cohorts persist even when looking within 
demographic groups. While wealth holdings were lifted by the home price increase, a 
sizable proportion of EBB arrives close to retirement with very small amounts of wealth. 
However, throughout the 1990s, there has been an explosion of initiatives aimed to foster 
savings. As mentioned before, many employers, particularly large ones and those offering 
DC pensions, have started offering retirement seminars to workers. Moreover, both the 
government and the financial industry have been active in promoting planning and saving 
for retirement. Have these initiatives had any impacts on household saving behavior? 
 Lusardi (1999) was the first to point out that many households do not plan for 
retirement, even when only 5 to 10 years away from it. This finding has been confirmed 
in other studies using different surveys, such as the Retirement Confidence Survey and 
the TIAA-CREF Survey (see, among others, Yakoboski and Dikemper 1997 and 
Ameriks, Caplin and Leahy 2003). Most importantly, Lusardi (1999, 2002, 2003) shows 
that planning is a powerful determinant of wealth; those who do not plan arrive at 
retirement with much lower amounts of wealth than those who plan. 
 In addition to providing a module on planning and financial literacy, the HRS in 
2004 re-introduced a question about retirement planning that was present in the 1992 
wave. 5 Thus, it is possible to examine how planning has changed between these two 
generations and whether and how much planning affects household wealth among EBB. 
Table 6 reports the degree of planning between the two cohorts and the distribution of 
                                                 
5 For a detailed discussion of the findings in the module on planning and financial literacy, see 
Lusardi and Mitchell (2006a). 
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wealth among different planning types. Several important facts emerge from these tables. 
First, the proportion of non-planners (those who have thought about retirement “hardly at 
all”) decreased among EBB compared to the HRS and the change in planning is 
statistically significant. However, a still large fraction of EBB, 27.5 percent, does not 
seem to have given any thought to retirement, even though they are only 5 to 10 years 
away. Second, planning is strongly correlated with wealth. Those who plan accumulate 
much larger amounts of wealth than non-planners. Looking at medians, planners hold 
double the amount of wealth than non-planners and differences are even larger at the first 
quartile of the wealth distribution. Note that many non-planners have accumulated very 
little wealth, while planners have accumulated up to 7 times the amount of wealth of non-
planners. Thus, for several households, lack of planning is tantamount to lack of savings. 
Note, however, there is not much difference in mean net worth between planning 
categories. This is because there are several extremely wealthy households who have not 
given any thought to retirement. We will later examine the impact of these households on 
estimates of the effect of planning. Finally, the effect of planning is strikingly similar 
between the two cohorts. Thus, the relationship between planning and wealth does not 
seem to have been much influenced by changes in home prices, changes in stock prices, 
or increases in financial education during the 1990s. 
 Table 6 here 
 Which households are more likely to be planners? In Figures 2A-2C, we report 
the proportion of planner types across education, sex, race, and across year/cohort. The 
large majority of those with less than a high school education are non-planners. This is 
the case not only in the HRS cohort, but also among EBB. The proportion of non-
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planners decreases as we move to higher education levels, but the share of non-planners 
across education groups is very similar between the two cohorts. This means that 
planning is strongly linked to education, although there is also a sizeable fraction of non-
planners among those with college and higher degrees. Since educational attainment has 
increased during the 1990s, this may explain why the fraction of non-planners has 
decreased in the same time period. Similarly, while financial education programs have 
been undertaken during the 1990s, many low income and minority workers were not 
exposed to such programs (see Lusardi 2004). This may explain why lack of planning 
tends to persist among these groups over time. 
 Planning is also strongly correlated with race: non-planners are disproportionately 
concentrated among Blacks and Hispanics. However, it is encouraging to see that the 
proportion of non-planners among Blacks and Hispanics tend to decrease between the 
two cohorts. There are also differences in planning between women and men; women are 
more likely to be non-planners both in 1992 and 2004. Lusardi and Mitchell (2006a,b) 
further show that planning is strongly correlated with financial literacy; those who can do 
simple calculations and understand the working of inflation, interest compounding, and 
risk diversification are also more likely to plan. 
 Figures 2A, 2B,2C here 
 Do the large differences in wealth across planning type persist when we account 
for demographic characteristic and income? Has the effect of planning changed over 
time? We turn now to a multivariate analysis of the effect of planning on wealth between 
the two cohorts. To construct the final sample, we first delete business owners from our 
sample. As reported in Hurst and Lusardi (2004, 2006) and Hurst, Lusardi, Kennickell 
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and Torralba (2005), business owners display different motives to save than other 
households. For example, business owners are less likely to have pensions and state they  
plan to never retire completely. They also display a stronger precautionary motive and 
bequest motive. Moreover, there are several measurement issues in assessing correctly 
their income, as they have a clear incentive to under-report earnings.6 Since it is difficult 
to account properly for all the differences among business owners and other households, 
we delete these households from the sample in both 1992 and 2004. While this has the 
advantage of curtailing the top of the wealth distribution, there still exists wide variation 
in household wealth holdings. Before performing the regressions, we further trim the top 
and the bottom 1 percent of the wealth distribution. We perform regressions for each 
cohort and in the pooled sample, where we combine the data between years. 
 Given there are such sharp differences between planners and non-planners (Table 
6), we construct a simple dummy for lack of planning (No planning) that takes the value 
1 when households report they have given hardly any thought to retirement. We include 
in the regressions other major determinants of wealth: age (and age squared), number of 
children, dummies for marital status, education, sex, race and ethnicity and whether the 
financial respondent is partially or fully retired. In addition, we include total household 
income.7 Together with race and education, income serves as a proxy for permanent 
income, i.e., lifetime income. Given that the distribution of wealth is skewed to the right, 
we perform quartile regressions rather than Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regressions. 
 The empirical estimates are provided in Tables 7A and 7B. Even after accounting 
for many demographic characteristics and income, the coefficient estimate of lack of 
                                                 
6 For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Hurst, Lusardi, Kennickell and Torralba (2005). 
7 To limit the effect of outliers, we take the log of income. This empirical specification is similar 
to the specification used in most studies on savings (see Lusardi 2002, 2003). 
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planning is always negative and statistically significant at each of the three quartiles of 
the wealth distribution in each cohort and in the pooled sample. The estimates are not 
only sizeable but they are very similar between cohorts (in the pooled sample, the 
interaction term between no planning and the 2004 year dummy is mostly not statistically 
significant). Irrespective of the changes throughout the 1990s, lack of planning continues 
to have the same effect: it sharply reduces wealth. Looking at medians, non-planners 
accumulate from $17,000 to $20,000 less wealth than those who do some (a little or a lot) 
planning. This corresponds to approximately 20 percent less wealth. This is consistent 
with estimates from previous studies (Lusardi 1999, 2003; Ameriks, Caplin and Leahy 
2003) that also show that lack of planning has an effect on wealth even after accounting 
for many determinants of wealth. It is also consistent with estimates from the 2004 HRS 
using a different measure of planning (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2006a). 
 Tables 7A and 7B here 
 Other variables have the expected sign. For example, wealth holdings increase 
with education. While in 1992, high school graduates accumulate more wealth than those 
with lower educational attainment, in 2004 the increase in wealth is concentrated among 
those with college or higher degrees. Blacks and Hispanics accumulate less wealth than 
Whites, but the effect is particularly pronounced among Blacks. Family break-ups, such 
as divorce and separation, are also a detriment to wealth accumulation. The effect of 
divorce in both the median and third quartile estimates is much larger among the EBB 
than the previous generation. Having more children also leads to lower wealth holdings. 
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 The effect of planning persists when we examine a different measure of wealth. In 
Table 8, we consider median regressions of total non-housing wealth.8 Lack of planning 
continues to be statistically significant and negative both across years and in the pooled 
sample. Thus, planning affects other components of wealth beyond housing equity. This 
result is to be expected as the effect of planning is similar between cohorts while housing 
equity increased substantially before 2004. 
 Table 8 here 
 
Interpreting the Effect of Planning 
The previous estimates show that the effect of planning on wealth is sizeable. 
How do we interpret the effect of lack of planning on wealth? To better understand this 
effect, in Table 9, we first report the median and OLS estimates of lack of planning on 
net worth. For brevity, only the estimates in the pooled sample are reported. Note that the 
OLS estimates of lack of planning are barely significant. This shows that the choice of 
estimation technique is critical to assess the effect of planning and, most importantly, that 
at high levels of wealth, planning may cease to matter.  
Table 9 here 
To understand this finding further, in Figure 3A and 3B we report the effects of 
non-planning at each percentile of the wealth distribution. The figures report the 
estimates and the 95 percent confidence intervals. Note that up to the 80th percentile of 
the wealth distribution, the estimates are negative (lack of planning leads to lower wealth) 
and the confidence intervals are narrow enough to make the estimates statistically 
                                                 
8 For brevity, we only report median rather then other quantile estimates, but planning has an 
effect across the wealth distribution. For a discussion of the role of housing wealth on retirement 
savings, see Venti and Wise (1990, 1991). 
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significant. While estimates become more negative as we move to higher values of 
wealth, as a proportion of wealth, lack of planning is particularly dire at the bottom of the 
wealth distribution. For example, for those households in the HRS cohort in the third 
decile of wealth, lack of planning is associated with a 30 percent reduction in wealth, 
while lack of planning in the sixth decile is associated with 13 percent lower wealth. 
Estimates are even higher among the EBB. Lack of planning in the third decile is linked 
to 45 percent less wealth holdings, while lack of planning in the sixth decile is linked to 
25 percent less wealth. 
The effect of lack of planning reverses as we move close to the top of the wealth 
distribution. Among EBB, as we move past the third quartile of wealth, the effect of lack 
of planning first becomes insignificant and then positive rather than negative. The same is 
true for the HRS cohort, even though the effect happens at higher percentiles of the 
wealth distribution. This was already evident in Table 6; the distribution of wealth among 
non-planners is very wide and includes several wealthy households. Given that these 
households can become influential observations in the OLS estimates, one has to be very 
careful in assessing the empirical estimates of lack of planning on wealth.  
Figures 3A and 3B here 
Our next goal is to show that planning has a causal influence on wealth. In other 
words, if someone were to begin planning tomorrow, he/she would end up with larger net 
worth because of it. However, since planning is potentially a decision variable, wealth 
could also influence planning through reverse causality. Therefore, a different estimation 
technique than simply OLS is necessary to establish the causal relationship. One reason 
reverse causality is a concern is that wealthy individuals may plan more because they 
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have more to gain from planning, driving the significance of the coefficient in the OLS 
and quantile regressions. However, it is also possible that extremely wealthy individuals 
plan less because they do not need to plan in order to build wealth, biasing the coefficient 
in the previous regressions toward zero.  
There is another important reason why the effects of planning on wealth are 
difficult to interpret. One worry, for example, is that there is an unobserved third factor, 
such as discipline, impatience, or cognitive ability, that is responsible for the observed 
correlation between planning and wealth. The IV strategy explained below will take care 
of this concern too. 
Previous research has accounted for reverse causality by using instruments for 
planning (Lusardi 2003; Ameriks, Caplin and Leahy 2003). Here, we develop a test to 
examine directly whether reverse causality exists by using an instrument for wealth. The 
instrument must first provide an exogenous change in wealth, one outside the control of 
the individual and uncorrelated with his or her preferences. If this exogenous change in 
wealth is uncorrelated with planning after accounting for all controls, then it allows us to 
test for reverse causality.  
To assess the economic importance of reverse causality, we first run a regression 
where the dependent variable is now lack of planning and the regressors include net 
worth and all of the demographic variables considered before, including income. The 
estimates in Table 10 show only a mild evidence of reverse causality. The effect of 
wealth is negative –higher wealth tends to decrease lack of planning-but the estimate are 
not always statistically significant (they are only significant at the 10 percent level in 
2004). Most importantly, the estimates are economically small in both 1992 and 2004 and 
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in the pooled sample; an increase in wealth of $10,000 decreases the probability of not-
planning by 0.54 percentage points in 1992, 0.45 percentage points in 2004, and 0.43 
percentage points in the pooled sample . Given that the estimates of wealth may be 
affected by influential observations, we also used a cubic transformation of wealth, but 
results are similar.9 
Table 10 here 
 We now perform IV estimation as net worth is clearly an endogenous variable. 
The instrument we use for net worth is recent changes in housing prices by region. This 
measure should be strongly correlated with wealth because, as reported before (Table 5), 
housing is a large component of total net worth for both cohorts. Because we exploit 
variation by region and not at the individual level, these price changes are not likely to be 
correlated with the individual propensity to plan except through the channel of net worth. 
As mentioned before, the EBB enjoyed a sharp increase in home prices both 
before and during 2004. However, there is wide variation in home prices across regions 
in the US. For example, while the Pacific region experienced an increase of 10.3 percent 
in 2003, the southeast region experienced an increase of 3.6 percent in 2003. The HRS 
cohort had the opposite experience; during 1990 and 1991 the housing market 
experienced a bust, which was particularly pronounced in specific regions of the United 
States, such as New England. We use the change in home prices in the previous year (i.e., 
the changes between 2004 and 2003 for EBB and the change between 1992 and 1991 for 
the HRS cohort) across regions as an instrument for wealth.10 
                                                 
9 We cannot take the log of wealth as many households have negative wealth particularly in 2004. 
For a similar wealth transformation, see Haliassos and Bertaut (1995). 
10 Hurst and Lusardi (2004) have used similar instruments for wealth to be able to assess the 
effect of wealth on business start-ups. 
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As the first stage regressions reported in Table 11 show, changes in regional 
prices are strong predictors of wealth; a 1 percent increase in home prices increases 
wealth by more than $16,000 among EBB, while a 1 percent decrease in prices during the 
early 1990s increased wealth by close to $5,000, perhaps a result of the fact that home 
prices had decreased sharply before that period and, consequently, had already depressed 
the value of wealth.11 In the pooled sample, the increase in wealth following a change in 
home prices is also positive. The IV estimates reported in Table 12 show that the effect of 
wealth-instrumented by changes in home prices- on lack of planning is either not 
statistically significant or positive. In addition, in both 1992 and 2004, the positive IV 
estimates are significantly different than the negative OLS point estimates; for both 
cohorts, exogenous increases in wealth tend to reduce the propensity to plan.12  
Tables 11 and 12 here 
If this is the case and if lack of planning is positively influenced by wealth, the 
OLS estimates are biased and represent an under-estimate of the effect of planning. This 
is what Lusardi (2003) finds in her IV estimates on the 1992 HRS data. The IV estimates 
of lack of planning on wealth are much larger than the OLS estimates. This is also 
consistent with the estimates of Ameriks, Caplin and Leahy (2003), who uses a different 
data set and use propensity to plan for a vacation and mathematical abilities as 
instruments for planning. 
                                                 
11 We have also considered other time periods. For example, we consider price changes in the 
previous two years and we consider price changes in a 10-year period. In both case, we find that 
price changes are good predictor of wealth. We report the estimates of the 1-year price change 
only because they are the strongest predictor of wealth.  IV estimates in the other two cases are 
similar. 
12 Given the importance of housing equity in the measure of total net worth, these estimates may 
simply show that planning has an effect on housing wealth. Unfortunately, we could not find 
instruments that predict non-housing wealth and we have to restrict the IV estimation to only one 
measure of household wealth. 
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To summarize: Planning is an important determinant of wealth and an important 
reason for why many families arrive close to retirement with little or no wealth. Both the 
quantile estimates and the IV exercise show that planning has a powerful effect on 
wealth. The IV estimation shows that reverse causality is not driving the significant 
relationship between wealth and lack of planning. In fact, reverse causality tends to result 
in an under-estimation of the effect of planning. Thus, the effect of planning is even 
stronger than the OLS and quantile estimates report. Moreover and most importantly, the 
effect of planning has remained unchanged between years. Thus, while the increase in 
home prices has lifted the wealth of many EBB, lack of planning has the same effect 
between cohorts: it sharply reduces wealth. 
 
Conclusion 
As EBB transition to retirement, a number of questions arise concerning their 
well-being into the future. In comparison to the HRS cohort in 1992, many EBB have 
accumulated larger amounts of wealth in 2004. However, this is not true for the whole 
cohort; many EBB families whose respondent is Black or has low education have 
accumulated less wealth than the previous generation. Moreover, with respect to the HRS 
cohort, a larger proportion of EBB wealth is exposed to fluctuations in asset prices, 
particularly housing prices. Thus, a decline in the housing market may generate 
substantial losses. Given that most EBB are home-owners and the housing market has 
experienced very rapid increases in the last few years, the behavior of this market should 
be watched carefully. 
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While several initiatives have been undertaken during the 1990s to foster 
retirement planning, a large fraction of EBB have still not given much thought to 
retirement even though they are only a few years away from it. Lack of planning is a 
crucial determinant of household wealth; those who do not plan accumulate much smaller 
amounts of wealth than those who do some planning. Estimates of the effect of planning 
are hard to assess because there is a small but influential group of the population that 
does not plan but holds high amounts of wealth. Nonetheless, for both EBB and the HRS 
cohort, lack of planning is tantamount to lack of savings. The effect of lack of planning is 
strikingly similar between cohorts. This is potentially due to the fact that non-planners are 
disproportionately those with low education, low income, and Blacks or Hispanics. Those 
households were not only largely unaffected by changes in the stock market, but they 
have been also left untouched by financial education programs instituted during the 
1990s. Public policies that aim to stimulate savings should consider incentives and 
programs that stimulate retirement planning. To be effective, these programs should 
better target those groups least likely to plan. 
In sum: EBB have higher amounts of wealth than the HRS cohort but this is 
hardly the result of an increase in retirement planning. Close to 30 percent of respondents 
in both cohorts have not given any thoughts to retirement, even thought they are not far 
away from it. Lack of planning leads to low- often minuscule- amounts of savings. The 
effect of planning is remarkably similar between cohorts. Thus, non-planners have not 
been much affected by the changes in the economy between 1992 and 2004, including the 
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Table 1: Demographic Characteristics of the HRS Cohort and the EBB. 
 
Cohort 1992 HRS Cohort 2004 EBB 
Age 
Average Age 53.7 53.7 
Education (%) 
Less Than High School 18.6 9.2 
High School Graduate 38.5 28.4 
Some College 21.1 29.0 
College Graduate 11.4 18.2 
More Than College 10.4 15.2 
Race/Ethnicity (%) 
White  85.9 80.8 
Black  10.2 11.7 
Hispanic 7.6 8.7 
Other 2.9 7.5 
Marital Status (%) 
Married 71.4 62.8 
Divorced  14.8 21.6 
Separated 3.4 3.3 
Widowed 5.5 4.9 
Never Married 4.3 7.2 
Children (% in sample) 
No Children 8.8 17.2 
Have Children 91.2 82.8 
Sex (% in sample) 
Male 55.7 54.4 
Female 44.3 45.6   
 
Note: Number of observations is 4,577 for the 1992 HRS cohort and 2,631 for the 2004 EBB. At least 





















Table 2: Distribution of Total Household Income in the 1992 and 2004 HRS 
(2004 $).  
 
Percentile  Income 1992 $  Income 2004 $  
 
5th 9,129 6,984 
10th 15,484 12,000 
25th 31,957 30,000 
 
50th 59,242 62,000 
 
75th 93,272 100,480 
90th 137,737 175,000 
95th 175,032 238,000 
 
Mean 73,592 85,931 
 
SD 76,610 109,144 
N. of obs. 4,577 2,631    
 
Note: At least respondent or spouse is 51-56 years old. All figures are weighted  
































Table 3A: Distribution of Total Net Worth in the 1992 and 2004 HRS  
(2004 $).  
 
Percentile      Total Net Worth 1992 ($) Total Net Worth 2004 ($)  
 
5th 0  -3,500 
10th 1,346  200 
25th 40,769  36,500 
 
50th 136,256  153,200 
 
75th 315,058  403,000 
90th 700,128  891,700 
95th 1,218,493  1,332,000 
 
Mean  327,715  391,959 
 
SD 738,164  969,128 
N of obs. 4,577  2,631     
 
Note: At least respondent or spouse is 51-56 years old. All figures are weighted  
using household weights.  
 
Table 3B: Distribution of Total Non-Housing Net Worth in the 1992  
and 2004 HRS (2004 $). 
 
Percentile  Non-Housing    Non-Housing 
   Net Worth 1992 ($)  Net Worth 2004 ($)  
5th -1481  -7,800 
10th 0  0 
25th 9,425  8,090 
 
50th 54,799  53,000 
 
75th 188,496  224,400 
90th 527,789  609,000 
95th 962,676  1,000,870 
 
Mean  239,145  264,526 
 
SD 687,774  849,317 
N of obs. 4,577  2,631    
 




Table 4: Distribution of Total Net Worth Across Demographics in the 1992 and 
2004 HRS (2004 $). 
 
 1992 2004 
 25th %         Median         75th %  25th %         Median       75th %  
Education 
< HS 1,346 41,065 118,214 200 22,500 80,000 
 
HS Grad 39,719 121,176 256,489 15,500 92,035 243,000 
 
Some Coll. 67,051 166,954 352,084 36,500 133,000 326,000 
 
Coll. Grad 117,137       257,163        556,467 140,000 302,000 690,000 
 
> College 149,451 291,361 706,860 171,000 365,800 847,500 
 
Race 
White  60,588 166,550 368,241 64,000 199,000 464,000 
 
Black 337 36,487 115,117 3 25,000 118,500 
 
Hispanic 2,693 46,047 126,562 5,000 55,800 200,000 
 
Marital Status  
Married  72,840 173,686 376,319 85,300 223,000 498,000 
 
Not Married 2,558 51,836 172,339 3,000 53,500 200,000 
 
Sex 
Male 58,568 166,954 368,943 55,960 196,000 490,000 
 
Female 20,869 102,326 250,431 19,800 104,600 297,500  
 
Note: At least respondent or spouse is 51-56 years old. Number of observations is 4,577 for the 1992 HRS 















Table 5: Asset Ownership and Percentage of Wealth Accounted for by Each Asset 
 
    N             Checking     Stock           IRA             Home           Real           Business 
                of obs          Account       Owner         Owner        Owner          Estate        Owner 
                          (%)               (%)              (%)             (%)               (%)            (%)  
Asset Ownership 
 
1992       4,577 82.8 30.6 40.6 78.6 24.8 19.0 
 
2004       2,631 86.9 31.0 41.6 80.3 17.5 14.8 
 
t-stat of diff            4.79       0.42  0.90         1.73            -7.52           -4.70 
(p value)            (0.00)          (0.67) (0.37) (0.08)  (0.00)         (0.00)  
 
Proportion of Total Net Worth 
 
1992       4577 5.6 8.3 7.5 27.0 16.8 16.7 
 
2004       2631 5.1 12.6 10.6 32.5 14.1 10.3  
 
Note: This table reports the ownership of assets for both the 1992 HRS cohort and the 2004 EBB (top 
panel). It also reports the proportion of total net worth accounted for by the assets listed in the first row 




























Table 6A: Planning and Total Net Worth in the 1992 HRS (2004 $) 
 
Group         % of  25th              Median   75th  Mean 
          Sample Percentile($)      ($)    Percentile($)   ($)  
Planning in 1992 
Hardly at All 32.0       10,098             76,906               200,613          224,311 
 
A Little 14.3 37,699  126,562   290,149 343,145 
 
Some  24.8 72,032  173,753   367,298 340,681 
 
A Lot  28.9 71,393  173,686   356,796 353,523 
 
Table 6B: Planning and Total Net Worth in the 2004 HRS (2004 $) 
 
Group         % of  25th                Median   75th   Mean 
          Sample Percentile ($)        ($)    Percentile ($)   ( $)  
Planning in 1992 
Hardly at All 27.5 9,100                80,000              271,000          315,644 
 
A Little           17.0 63,500              173,400            392,000          364,464 
 
Some   27.9 53,000              189,000            447,200          366,074 
 
A Lot  27.6 54,000              201,700            470,900          513,211 
 
Note: Percentages of respondent in each planning group are conditional on being asked the planning 
















Table 7A. Quantile Regressions of Net Worth on Planning in 1992 and 2004 (2004 $)  
    25th %  25th %  Median  Median  75th %  75th % 
    1992  2004  1992  2004  1992  2004   
No Planning    -12.495  -14.390  -17.233  -20.025  -42.059  -47.362 
    (3.563)*** (4.022)*** (4.391)*** (8.818)** (7.450)*** (21.751)** 
High School Graduate  13.241  -5.132  21.493  2.733  31.133  9.228 
    (4.297)*** (6.220)  (5.151)*** (13.753) (8.563)*** (31.611) 
Some College   19.963  -4.127  38.655  20.278  73.552  44.360 
    (5.101)*** (6.403)  (6.150)*** (14.134) (10.406)*** (32.831) 
College Graduate  46.990  51.527  83.054  113.995 188.936 237.035 
    (6.344)*** (7.382)*** (7.691)*** (16.195)*** (13.229)*** (38.294)*** 
More than College  70.954  62.327  121.807 169.988 252.906 441.711 
    (6.847)*** (7.966)*** (8.318)*** (17.136)*** (14.153)*** (40.818)*** 
Hispanic   -10.389  -13.237  -13.289  -18.879  -25.028  -45.239 
    (5.125)** (6.040)** (6.290)** (13.226) (10.651)** (30.783) 
Black    -23.053  -22.463  -33.550  -33.360  -74.087  -71.828 
    (4.058)*** (4.656)*** (4.875)*** (10.032)*** (8.062)*** (24.231)*** 
Divorced   -31.876  -28.229  -41.669  -53.389  -47.224  -91.769 
    (4.821)*** (4.727)*** (5.820)*** (10.372)*** (9.912)*** (25.910)*** 
Separated   -19.096  -28.862  -31.846  -43.898  -7.757  -80.357 
    (8.528)** (9.091)*** (9.942)*** (18.951)** (16.231) (44.329)* 
Widowed   -13.250  -18.524  -25.976  -21.952  10.445  57.775 
    (6.799)* (8.414)** (8.313)*** (18.043) (14.764) (48.528) 
Never Married   -33.322  -26.127  -44.268  -52.984  -41.714  -105.520 
    (8.055)*** (7.075)*** (9.714)*** (15.418)*** (16.204)** (39.251)*** 
Female    1.985  -9.671  12.805  -10.073  23.687  -13.595 
    (3.384)  (3.748)*** (4.171)*** (8.174)  (7.184)*** (19.895) 
Log of Income   31.160  30.540  45.063  46.719  61.048  61.415 
    (1.891)*** (1.449)*** (2.577)*** (3.854)*** (5.283)*** (13.278)***  
Adjusted R-Squared  0.12  0.11  0.15  0.15  0.17  0.17   
Note: This table reports quantile regressions of total net worth on planning and other determinants of wealth. Net worth is divided by 1,000. Even though the estimates are not 
reported, regressions include dummies for retirement status (fully and partially retired), number of children, age and age squared. The total number of observations is 3,727 in 1992 
and 2,156 in 2004. Business owners and the top and bottom 1% of the wealth distribution are excluded. Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% 
***  Significant at 1%.  
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Table 7B. Quantile Regressions of Net Worth on Planning in the Pooled Sample (2004 $) 
   25th %   Median   75th %   
No Planning  -11.034   -11.334   -30.007 
   (3.168)***  (5.959)*  (10.772)*** 
Year 2004  3.006   13.864   37.596 
   (2.836)   (5.358)***  (9.680)*** 
No Plan*Year 2004 -2.689   -16.019   -20.723 
   (5.108)   (9.578)*  (16.943) 
High School Graduate 3.737   10.749   23.326 
   (3.722)   (7.082)   (11.644)** 
Some College  4.879   23.152   58.355 
   (4.171)   (7.903)***  (13.313)*** 
College Graduate 50.173   104.611  240.050 
   (5.072)***  (9.543)***  (16.590)*** 
More than College 66.139   144.543  384.486 
   (5.588)***  (10.270)***  (17.962)*** 
Hispanic  -10.526   -16.305   -40.647 
   (4.320)**  (7.975)**  (13.421)*** 
Black   -24.279   -36.609   -76.166 
   (3.475)***  (6.397)***  (11.062)*** 
Divorced  -29.716   -46.909   -78.468 
   (3.791)***  (6.954)***  (12.459)*** 
Separated  -21.814   -33.786   -56.986 
   (6.858)***  (12.223)***  (19.582)*** 
Widowed  -14.713   -16.569   20.426  
   (5.918)**  (10.908)  (20.844) 
Never Married  -27.867   -48.068   -85.901 
   (5.943)***  (11.058)***  (19.394)*** 
Female   -4.104   -3.584   5.403 
   (2.860)   (5.256)   (9.225) 
Log of Income  31.750   45.898   56.276 
   (1.245)***  (2.779)***  (6.740)***  
Adj. R-Squared  0.11   0.15   0.17   
Note: This table reports quantile regressions of total net worth on planning and other determinants of wealth. Net worth 
is divided by 1,000. Regressions include dummies for retirement status (fully and partially retired), number of children, 
age and age squared. The total number of observations is 3,727 in 1992 and 2,156 in 2004. Business owners and the top 
and bottom 1% of the wealth distribution are excluded. Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10%  













Table 8. Median Regression of Non-Housing Wealth on Planning in 1992 and 2004 
(2004 $) 
   1992   2004   Pooled Sample  
No Planning  -9.904   -9.709   -4.320 
   (3.046)***  (3.809)**  (2.437)* 
Year 2004        9.903 
         (2.197)*** 
No Plan*Year 2004       -7.546 
         (3.912)* 
High School Grad 7.509   1.854   3.635 
   (3.584)**  (5.992)   (2.886) 
Some College  19.197   8.400   9.731 
   (4.278)***  (6.142)   (3.218)*** 
College Grad  48.015   67.826   33.534 
   (5.365)***  (7.068)***  (3.894)*** 
More than College 89.882   82.480   49.242 
   (5.812)***  (7.432)***  (4.194)*** 
Hispanic  -9.920   -8.107   -6.417 
   (4.372)**  (5.796)   (3.253)** 
Black   -14.874  -17.721  -18.132 
   (3.389)***  (4.356)***  (2.621)*** 
Divorced  -16.765  -15.748  -30.747 
   (4.037)***  (4.462)***  (2.840)*** 
Separated  -9.045   -9.473   -23.136 
   (6.978)   (8.460)   (4.975)*** 
Widowed  -5.448   5.742   -16.756 
   (5.763)   (7.863)   (4.468)*** 
Never Married  -14.331  -11.639  -29.668 
   (6.765)**  (6.817)*  (4.539)*** 
Female  2.538   -9.862   -1.163 
   (2.887)   (3.552)***  (2.156) 
Log of Income 18.632   17.388   17.959 
   (1.799)***  (1.685)***  (1.138)***   
Adj. R- Squared 0.10   0.09   0.13    
Note: This table reports median regressions of non-housing net worth on planning and other determinants of 
wealth. Non-housing wealth is divided by 1,000. Regressions include dummies for retirement status (fully and 
partially retired), number of children, age and age squared. The total number of observations is 3,727 in 1992 and 
2,156 in 2004. Business owners and the top and bottom 1% of the wealth distribution are excluded. Standard 
errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at 1%.  
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Table 9. OLS and Median Regressions of Net Worth on Planning in the Pooled 
Sample (2004 $) 
 
    OLS    Median    
No Planning   -5.054    -11.334 
    (16.362)   (5.959)* 
Year 2004   61.832    13.864 
    (11.080)***   (5.358)*** 
No Plan*Year 2004  -29.273   -16.019 
    (20.472)   (9.578)* 
High School Graduate -4.144    10.749 
    (14.964)   (7.082) 
Some College   15.388    23.152 
    (16.011)   (7.903)*** 
College Graduate  144.198   104.611 
    (18.618)***   (9.543)*** 
More than College  223.429   144.543 
    (19.633)***   (10.270)*** 
Hispanic   -50.212   -16.305 
    (17.283)***   (7.975)** 
Black    -79.631   -36.609 
    (14.095)***   (6.397)*** 
Divorced   -53.933   -46.909 
    (12.251)***   (6.954)*** 
Separated   -27.735   -33.786 
    (24.611)   (12.223)*** 
Widowed   69.078    -16.569 
    (20.017)***   (10.908) 
Never Married   -51.683   -48.068 
    (19.922)***   (11.058)*** 
Female   -18.607   -3.584 
    (9.680)*   (5.256) 
Log of Income  87.532    45.898 
    (5.042)***   (2.779)***  
Adjusted R-Squared  0.20    0.15     
Note: This table reports OLS and median regressions of total net worth on planning and other determinants of 
wealth in the pooled sample. Net worth is divided by 1,000. Regressions include dummies for retirement status 
(fully and partially retired), number of children, age and age squared. The total number of observations is 5,883. 
Business owners and the top and bottom 1% of the wealth distribution in each year are excluded. Standard errors 
in parentheses. * Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at 1%.  
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Table 10. OLS Regression of Planning on Total Net Worth (2004 $) 
 
   1992   2004   Pooled Sample  
Net Worth  -.000054  -.000045  -.000043 
   (.000027)**  (.000024)*  (.000016)*** 
Year 2004        -0.016 
         (0.012) 
High School Grad -0.080   -0.117   -0.107 
   (0.020)***  (0.036)***  (0.019)*** 
Some College  -0.114   -0.119   -0.123 
   (0.024)***  (0.036)***  (0.020)*** 
College Grad  -0.117   -0.167   -0.158  
   (0.029)***  (0.041)***  (0.023)*** 
More than College -0.103   -0.134   -0.127 
   (0.032)***  (0.043)***  (0.025)*** 
Hispanic  0.094   0.023   0.058 
   (0.026)***  (0.037)   (0.022)*** 
Black   0.036   0.022   0.027 
   (0.023)   (0.029)   (0.018) 
Divorced  -0.010   0.051   0.037 
   (0.021)   (0.024)**  (0.015)** 
Separated  0.070   0.053   0.069 
   (0.039)*  (0.051)   (0.031)** 
Widowed  0.035   0.056   0.056 
   (0.031)   (0.043)   (0.025)** 
Never Married  0.044   0.067   0.064 
   (0.036)   (0.039)*  (0.025)** 
Female   0.087   0.004   0.038 
   (0.016)***  (0.020)   (0.012)*** 
Log of Income  -0.075   -0.009   -0.026 
   (0.010)***  (0.010)   (0.006)***   
R-Squared  0.11   0.06   0.07    
Note: This table reports OLS regressions of not planning on total net worth. Net worth is divided by 1,000. 
Regressions include dummies for retirement status (fully and partially retired), number of children, age and age 
squared. The total number of observations is 3,727 in 1992, 2,156 in 2004 and 5,883 in the pooled sample. 
Business owners and the top and bottom 1% of the wealth distribution in each year are excluded. Standard errors 


















Table 11. First Stage Regressions of IV Estimation of Total Net Worth on Housing 
Price Increases  
     1992  2004  Pooled Sample  
Percentage Increase   -4.988  16.757  10.911 
     (2.121)** (3.239)*** (1.885)*** 
Year 2004        1.023 
         (13.363)  
High School Graduate   13.335  -10.745  -0.105 
     (12.481) (30.827) (14.806) 
Some College    49.170  1.236  14.734 
     (14.651)*** (31.173) (15.770) 
College Graduate   96.897  168.292 150.764 
     (17.986)*** (35.201)*** (18.320)*** 
More than College   164.724 242.018 226.037 
     (19.304)*** (37.028)*** (19.454)*** 
Hispanic    -40.042  -68.629  -55.268 
     (16.332)** (31.973)** (17.069)*** 
Black     -75.006  -84.326  -81.589 
     (14.207)*** (25.246)*** (14.096)*** 
Divorced    -51.387  -63.436  -59.194 
     (13.185)*** (21.029)*** (12.149)*** 
Separated    -41.291  -34.927  -32.472 
     (23.928)* (45.006) (24.560) 
Widowed    -24.493  124.459 64.629 
     (18.949) (37.443)*** (20.031)*** 
Never Married    -60.063  -64.316  -61.223 
     (22.460)*** (33.540)* (19.738)*** 
Female     29.290  -39.638  -14.117 
     (9.745)*** (17.105)** (9.579) 
Log of Income    83.800  84.658  86.004 
     (5.997)*** (8.322)*** (4.989)***   
R-Squared    0.19  0.22  0.21    
Note: This table reports OLS regressions of total net worth on the percentage increase in housing prices by 
region in the previous year. Net worth is divided by 1,000. Regressions include dummies for retirement status 
(fully and partially retired), number of children, age and age squared. The total number of observations is 3,727 
in 1992, 2,156 in 2004, and 5,883 in the pooled sample. Business owners and the top and bottom 1% of the 
wealth distribution in each year are excluded. Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10% ** Significant 














Table 12. Instrumental Variables Estimation of Not Planning on Net Worth 
  
 1992 2004 Pooled Sample 
 
OLS -.000054 -.000045 -.000043 
 (.000027)** (.000024)* (.000016)*** 
 
IV .00287 .000387 .000135 
 (.00142)** (.00024) (.000225) 
 
Hausman Test    13.283       2.951                       0.279 
(P-Value)                      (0.0003)*** (0.085)*                  (0.597)  
 
Note: This table reports IV regressions of not planning on total net worth. Net worth is divided by 1,000. The 
total number of observations is 3,727 in 1992, 2,156 in 2004 and 5,883 in the pooled sample. Business owners 
and the top and bottom 1% of the wealth distribution in each year are excluded. Standard errors in parenthesis 





Figure 1A: Ownership of Homes and Other Real Estate in 1992 and 2004  
Across the Distribution of Assets 
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Figure 1B. Ownership of Stocks and IRAs in 1992 and 2004  
Across the Distribution of Assets 
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Figure 3A. Estimates of the Effect of Not Planning on Net Worth at Each 
Percentile of the Wealth Distribution in 1992 
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Percentage of Net Worth Accounted for by Not Planning at Each Decile of the 
Wealth Distribution in 1992 
 
Decile   Estimate   Net Worth  Percentage                   
10th %   -5.90   0   NA 
20th %   -11.94   6.92   172.57 
30th %   -9.27   31   29.90 
40th %   -10.77   60   17.95 
50th %   -17.23   104   16.57 
60th %   -20.92   161   13.00 
70th %   -33.81   229.4   14.74 
80th %   -55.61   357.61   15.55 





Figure 3B. Estimate of the Effect of Not Planning on Net Worth at Each 
Percentile of the Wealth Distribution in 2004 
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Percentage of Net Worth Accounted for by Not Planning at Each Decile of the 
Wealth Distribution in 2004 
 
Decile   Estimate   Net Worth  Percentage                   
10th %   -8.21   0   NA 
20th %   -10.78   10.77   100.04 
30th %   -15.83   35.01   45.22 
40th %   -16.08   60.59   26.54 
50th %   -20.03   92.90   21.56 
60th %   -32.88   131.95   24.92 
70th %   -40.17   181.44   22.14 
80th %   -44.68   258.18   17.30 
90th %   -33.12   420.08   7.88 
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